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Ten Years Under the 1996
Telecommunications Act'
Reed Hundt*
Approximately every two years, on average, Congress makes
significant changes in the nation's rule of law governing the
communications and media industries. Sometimes the changes express
direct commands, but more often than not, the new laws express intent to
achieve a general goal through specific regulation.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act") contained, for
instance, the direct command, in effect, to allow rapid and major
consolidation of the radio industry. Even direct commands do not
necessarily produce the outcomes sought. A few companies did consolidate
the terrestrial radio industry under a few roofs. That consolidation did
substantially limit the possibility of a liberal radio network and might have
been intended for this purpose by Congress. However, the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") quite consciously offset the
congressional desire to cement a conservative point of view in radio by
creating two national satellite radio firms that each would have enough
channel capacity to carry diverse viewpoints for purely economic reasons.
And so it came to pass that eventually Karmazin took his managerial
genius to the very high tower called a satellite, and Stern inevitably
followed.
The FCC more directly determines outcomes when the congressional
mandate is more directional than specific. In the 1996 Act, Congress
intended to allow the Bell companies to escape the Modified Final
1. Keynote speech delivered at the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Ten Years Later
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Judgment by entering the long-distance fixed-line voice market and in
return intended to have AT&T and MCI enter the historically lawfully
monopolized local fixed-line voice market. These two markets were both
very large. Presumably, it was imagined by some in Congress that pursuant
to the statute. a high-stakes musical chairs game would result. Presumably,
the drafters believed that the competition in each other's adjacent market
would lead to an equilibrium by which-to give a hypothetical example-
AT&T would have 40% of the long-distance ("LD") market and 30% of
the local market, and in any geographical market, the competing Bell
would have 30% of the LD market and 40% of the local market.
This was the central focus of the 1996 Act. The result I have outlined
was at all times improbable. Technological change and adjacent market
entry produced different strategic challenges than the statutory drafters
apparently presumed. Intrusive and Jarndycean-and what a Bleak House
indeed!-judicial intervention delayed crucial timing for market entry by
the interexchange carriers ("IXCs"). Regulatory policy flip flops at the
FCC in 2001and 2002 played a big role in the outcome. Strategic blunders
by AT&T, corruption at MCI, and wise moves at (then) SBC and Bell
Atlantic were more important than any rule of law in determining the
outcomes. But at all times, the more likely result was not the tottering
seesaw balance imagined by some in Congress but a winner-take-all result
in which either the local firms or the long-distance firms emerged after
competition as winners, measured by return to shareholders and economic
profit.
It has come to pass that all communications companies, not just
telephone companies ("telcos") but all, including cable and wireless firms,
have returned to shareholders about three times their money from 1995 to
the present. That's a terrific result in terms of total return to shareholders.
Some, like AT&T and MCI, destroyed value for shareholders in the
decade. Competitive local exchange carriers ("CLECs") largely went from
zero to a big number and back to nearly zero in a rapid cycle in the middle
of the decade. However, the winners in American telecommunications
emerged transformed and successful from a decade of change. The big
story is that some communications companies successfully went into the
adjacent markets of wireless and broadband, while a few failed to negotiate
such entry in a timely or effective manner.
The success stories were only partly a function of the FCC's rule of
law. Regardless of the FCC, MCI and AT&T were principally doomed by
their management's unfortunate decisions-in the former case, not to go
into wireless and then not to tell the truth in financial statements; in the
latter case, to spin off wireless and then to sell cable. An honest MCI with a
wireless business would be what Sprint is today-a huge value-creation
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story and a real threat to its rival. If AT&T had kept wireless and not
borrowed too much for cable acquisitions, it would be today's Comcast and
it also would have the wireless business Comcast wants. As such, AT&T
would be the leading communications firm in America. Of course, it is
anyhow-but in name only.
Is the story of law, then, a story of it not mattering as much as
Washington thinks to the outcome of communications markets? Not really.
In fact, the rule of law shaped choices for firms. It created an architecture
of opportunities. Not all took equal advantage of opportunities, but we
choose competition as a form of market structure precisely in order to
reward those who have the audacity, skill, and luck to take advantage of
their chances.
The first crucial architectural statute was the 1993 Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act ("OBRA"), by which the FCC was granted the authority
to create a multifirm competitive wireless industry through the efficient
technique of auctions. The mistake the FCC made, for which I am
responsible, was not filing liens that would have provided protection
against bankruptcy by a winning bidder. Bankruptcy itself was not a bad
result for the economy; the litigation about the bankruptcy was the bad
result because it kept the spectrum off the market. Otherwise, the auctions
worked out superbly for long-run investors, entrepreneurial operators, and
both business and consumer customers. An important contribution to these
outcomes was the FCC decision pursuant to the 1996 Act to establish a
clear and very low cost interconnection price for wireless to wire
communications. In some countries, wire subsidized wireless through
interconnection regulation; in others, wireless subsidized wire; in the
United States, the interconnection regime did not pass major sums to either
side. Reasonably efficient competition between wireless and wire resulted,
and at the same time, wireless entrepreneurs had a fair chance to compete
against wireless-wire integrated firms.
One of the chief reasons for the FCC's good decisions was brilliant
new hires. The lesson here is that the chairman of the FCC needs talented
people to tell him what to do. I had such people. The reason I had enough
of them was that Senator Stevens and Senator Hollings kindly honored our
request for more people in 1993 and again in 1995. We hired about 400
people in my four years. Many are leaders of the Communications Bar
today. The hiring was done primarily by people skilled in the field and in
the mores of the bureaucracy, and I do not mean me. Chairman Martin is
brilliant, able, genial, and astute. My advice to him is to hire well, often,
and soon. In this respect, among others, he's off to a great start.
The 1996 Act and its predecessor the 1934 Act also wisely gave the
FCC the authority to preclude the owners of the local loop from
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appropriating narrowband Internet access as a business just for them.
Instead, the FCC in the 1990s chose to make the local wire network a
platform for the World Wide Web and to deny the Bells the ability to
charge anything significant to Internet Service Providers for using that
platform. The platform became a commons in which creativity flourished.
This led to the lowest priced Internet access in the world. Given America's
large installed base of computers, the result was that the Internet became an
American phenomenon. Now that the Web experience is migrating to
broadband, the question of a free and open platform is again one of the
most important issues facing the FCC. However, for its time, the free
narrowband platform was, in my view, one of the great contributions to
economic growth, productivity gains, and entrepreneurship in the history of
the United States.
The IXC versus incumbent local exchange carrier ("ILEC")
competition, meanwhile, produced two interesting outcomes, the first not
predicted by anyone and the second quite specifically intended by the 1996
Act and the FCC.
First, many rival IXC networks were built. However, the capital
markets were so easy to access, and Alan Greenspan was so loath to pop
the equity bubble, that many thousands of miles of redundant fiber were
laid between city pairs. As a result, by the time the Bells entered long
distance, the market was not worth the effort. Businesses and consumers
were better off with LD becoming almost as free as the Internet, but the
Bells had little value to capture. It was as if the Spanish had launched an
armada to go to the New World and found the Incans and Aztecs had not
hoards of gold but palaces of dross.
Second, IXCs and other CLECs competed successfully for enterprise
customers and drove prices way down for American businesses. That
contributed to a productivity surge that has lasted to this day.
After many years of pointless and time-consuming judicial review,
consumers in 2001 were about to enjoy the same price reductions asa
result of unbundled network elements-platform ("UNE-P"). But Michael
Powell chose to assign value to companies, not consumers, and over the
objections of his colleagues obtained the blessing of the D.C. Court of
Appeals for the elimination of UNE-P. I'm tempted to say that he voted for
UNE-P before he voted against it. My own view is that the FCC would
have done well to have phased out UNE-P on a predictable basis through
the early 2000s, as cable and wireless offered substitutes in the local
market. A compromise plan to that effect would have been superior both
for capital formation and competition as compared to the contentious FCC
proceedings and unnecessary judicial intrusions. In any case, this topic
illustrates the crucial importance of the FCC chairman in determining the
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outcome of any statute in this area.
In the area of universal service, the 1996 Act very wisely and
effectively accomplished two things: first, it gave the FCC the power to
collect universal service funds from every firm competing in relevant
markets. On this topic, more needs to be done, and Chairman Martin will
need the help of his able colleagues to do what we know he knows is the
right thing. Second, it empowered the FCC to connect to the Internet 100%
of children in classrooms, through Section 254, and also 100% of people
with disabilities, through Sections 255-57, which came from the
Americans with Disabilities Act. In both these respects, Chairman Martin
has important decisions to make, but already the United States leads the
world in terms of providing Internet access and expertise to children of
every income level and ethnic origin. That is a truly laudable
accomplishment for which the country must thank Senators Snowe and
Rockefeller, as well as hundreds of people at National Exchange Carriers
Association ("NECA"), Universal Service Administrative Company
("USAC"), and the FCC, and of course thousands of educators and
librarians.
Some contend that the history of the 1996 Act demonstrates that
lawmakers and regulators cannot predict the results of their actions and so
should do nothing. By this reasoning, few of us would get out of bed in the
morning. Moreover, overall, the 1996 Act helped firms create value for
shareholders, helped competitors transfer much value to consumers, and
greatly stimulated productivity gains and entrepreneurship in America.
Less noticed and very interesting is the fact that the 1996 Act sparked
a civil contest of ideas among national, federal, and state regulators and
other policy influencers. As a result, most of the world's nations entered
into a World Trade Organization telecommunications treaty that
contributed substantially to global economic development. That treaty now
should be used to tackle in global forums the crucial issue of maintaining a
unified, seamless, transparent global Internet. Chairman Martin would be a
great ambassador for the United States. We have only a year or two to
shape the future of the global Web.
Another good outcome of the exchange of ideas-ideas are always
more important than courts in shaping a culture-was that America's state
regulators enthusiastically embraced the national policy of promoting
competition as their primary goal. Ultimately, they became perhaps more
Catholic than the Pope on many issues, to the surprise of many incumbent
companies. I suspect Commissioner Tate will prove of great value to
Chairman Martin in maintaining rapport between the state and federal
regulators. The chief challenges for federal-state cooperation now include
maintaining an adequate and pro-competitive base of funding for universal
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service and extending broadband to 100% of children, disabled, and low-
income citizens.
Ten years after the 1996 Act, there is no need for a sweeping overhaul
of the communications law. The FCC has all the jurisdictional power it
needs for implementing wise policies. It would be nice to have a law that
ordered courts to apply Chevron deference and that gave one circuit court
jurisdiction over the statute. It would be good if that court was not the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals, given its refusal to eschew judicial activism in
this topic area. Let's not nominate the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
either; they'll tell you how to tie your shoes if you let them. However, as
long as the FCC general counsel-not anyone else !-writes the decisions
that are voted and is given free hand to argue as appropriate, the FCC will
win on appeal whatever is important. By contrast, a new law would delay
many issues from being resolved, will not necessarily produce clearer
guidance than the FCC, and would not improve the consultation that
Congress can already provide. History also shows that any
telecommunications bill opens the door to the sort of lobbying that is not
giving Washington a good name right now.
In any event, with or without a new law, the FCC will affect the
future in a major way by its approach to the question of broadband's
openness. Sometimes called net neutrality, the question of openness is
multidimensional. It is hard to define and harder to answer. Chairman
Martin and his colleagues have the talent, expertise, and courage to come
up with the right answers on this topic.
In conclusion, I want to exercise the traditional power of the former
chairman to offer free advice to the current chair without regard for the
degree of difficulty in translating advice into action and paying no attention
to my own lack of information and wisdom.
First, discuss the complexities of the open Internet in an open way. By
asking the right questions not only in the United States, but all around the
world, you will help everyone find sensible answers.
Second, cultural change is more important than regulatory change.
Talk openly and consistently about the pros and cons of an open Web in
terms of American and international culture.
Third, Michael Porter of the Harvard Business School correctly stated
that the only purpose of a national economic policy is to produce a high
and rising standard of living for a country's citizens. That, in turn, implies
that the only economic purpose of the FCC's policies is to increase
productivity gains in communications and information industries. Those
gains, in turn, come from increases in aggregate and per capita bit
production and consumption. Bit production includes, for example, a voice
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telephone call and making a movie. Bit consumption includes, for example,
reading e-mail while I'm talking, glancing at an instand message when I
want you to look at a slide, browsing on your blackberry when I want you
to be applauding, and buying my new book from Amazon.com this fall. So
this is the FCC's goal. The rest is detail. But go ahead and issue a white
paper stating the goal!
Fourth, every quarter, issue reports on sectoral performance so that
everyone in the communications and information industries can know how
America is doing. The current reporting function is woefully out of date
and out of tune with relevant markets.
Fifth, explicitly tie every decision to your overall policy goal. Write
that linkage into the decision and try to drive your philosophy into the
heads of the reviewing judges. There's no way around them, so just run
through them.
Sixth, as the facts change, change your opinions.
Seventh, endlessly explain what you are doing and why you are doing
it.
Eighth, add fifty key people of your choice to the policymaking ranks.
You have fine folks around you, but as always, they will welcome the help.
Ninth, experiment. Jawbone industry to build a Wi-Fi mesh network
available for free use in New Orleans, or endorse a single all-fiber
completely open network providing 100 gigabits per second and 1000 cable
channels for all of western Montana. Just see what happens.
Tenth, don't hesitate to tell Congress what is true. They can take it.
Eleventh, don't hesitate to tell industry what is true. They already
know, and they just need to know that you know.
Twelfth, don't hesitate to tell Americans what is important. They
want to know.
Thirteenth, you will never again in your life have such a fine
opportunity to help the American Dream come true. On everything, hurry
up and do the right thing as you see it. Remember, you're not elected, and
you're not there long, so just do what you think is right in an open manner,
and let the chips fall where they may.
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